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Introduction

Numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) contain provisions imposing human
rights-related obligations, particularly in the case of agreements between the European Union and a developing country (often a former colony). Such obligations
often consist of hortatory "best endeavors" language rather than legally binding
provisions. Even the small number of provisions that are binding are very rarely
enforced. Furthermore, even if an FTA features human rights-related provisions,
it may contain other terms that have negative implications for human rights.
Thus, including human rights provisions in FTAs will not necessarily result in
better human rights outcomes. There are additional reasons to be cautious about
the potential for FTAs to improve the circumstances of developing countries.
There is an inherent inequality in FTA negotiations between developed and developing countries. And trade agreements vary significantly in the degree to
which they provide for financial, technical, logistical, and other forms of assis*
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tance to their developing country participants. Indeed, there has been a recent
trend towards negotiating FTAs and other trade agreements amongst predominantly developed countries. These agreements tend to focus on achieving commitments to liberalize trade more deeply and broadly than that to which the
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership as a whole would be likely to
agree. Such "high standard" agreements do not make many, if any, provisions for
particularized needs or different capabilities of developing countries. It is therefore not surprising that such agreements and negotiations have no least-developed country (LDC)i or poorer developing country participants. Given the
unfavorable bargaining power developing countries face in FTA negotiations
with developed country partners and the trend towards negotiating FTAs that are
not well-aligned with poorer countries' interests, FTAs may not be a suitable
forum for addressing human rights-related concerns.
Furthermore, even though the European Union's FTAs among others contain
human rights clauses, such FTAs by and large do not include the countries with
the worst human rights abuses. While human rights violations occur in all countries, there is a significant correlation between level of economic development
and such abuses. 2 The countries that are considered to have the highest levels of
corruption and human rights abuses are not, by and large, participating in FTAs
or other reciprocal trade agreements, at least in part because they are not members of the WTO. While the WTO is not a panacea for developing countries, it
may provide the better space - as compared to FTAs - for achieving objectives
in furtherance of human rights objectives.
This article begins in Part II with a brief discussion of the historical debates
over human rights and trade linkage and the practice of including human rights
provisions in FTAs. Part HI identifies a number of concerns regarding the inclusion of human rights obligations in FTAs, including the fact that FTAs rarely
include the worst human rights offenders. Part IV then argues that it may be
preferable - and more fruitful - to promote human rights by bringing the worst
culprits into the WTO, and details some of the ways human rights concerns can
be promoted through the WTO and membership therein. Part V then concludes.

I "LDC" is the term the United Nations uses to refer to countries it has identified as being lowincome and suffering from severe structural obstacles to sustainable development. The criteria used to
determine LDC status includes gross national income per capita; a human asset index; and an economic
vulnerability index. There are presently 48 countries classified as LDCs. See What are least developed
countries (LDCs)?, UNIID NATIONS (last visited Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/development/
desa/policy/cdp/ldcjinfo.shtml.
2 Indeed, the denial of economic opportunity can be seen as a direct violation of human rights. See
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). However,
economic rights are often seen as "second generation" rights that are a lower priority than "first generation" civil and political rights. See, e.g., Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA J.
lrrr' L L. 589, 605 and n.42 (1996); see also Makau Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness:Pathologies of Choice and Substance, 56 BuiF. L. Riiv. 1027, 1028 (2008) ("[Tlhere has never been a major
human rights NGO in the West that focuses on economic, social, and cultural rights. The problem is not
simply one of orientation, but a fundamental philosophical commitment by movement scholars and activists to vindicate 'core' political and civil rights [over other types of rights] . . . .").
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II.

Trade and Human Rights - To Link or Not to Link?

There has been a lengthy debate within academia and the GATT/WTO membership regarding the linkage or lack thereof between trade and human rights,
and to what degree any such linkage should be formalized within the GATT/

WTO.
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has long argued that international trade governance
in the WTO should be "constitutionalized" in conformity with Members' human
rights obligations and that the right to trade should be seen as a human right.3
While many ascribe to Petersmann's views, his position has also been subject to
numerous critiques.4
Disagreement remains over whether human rights should be written more explicitly into the WTO Agreements. However, views have evolved such that it is
now much more common to see commentators claim that human rights are implicitly consistent with the WTO and that the WTO should be read consistent
with other international law obligations, including human rights treaties and principles of customary international law. 5 As will be discussed below, there have
been numerous examples of WTO members finding ways to allow human rights
concerns to be addressed, and for such concerns to be acknowledged by dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body.
Nonetheless, the WTO membership as a whole is highly unlikely to provide
for more explicit human rights-related obligations in any sort of agreement. Developing countries are generally opposed to such provisions and have not been
willing to discuss them in the WTO context. Although developing countries can
use their numbers to their advantage within the WTO, they are not able to do so
when negotiating an FTA with a developed-country partner.6 In the FTA con3 Petersmann has published extensively on this subject for over twenty years. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann,

CONsTrrrUIoNAL FUNCTIONS

AND CONsTIrruTIONAL PROBLEMS

OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-

NOMic LAW (1991); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT'i.

EcON. L. 19 (2000); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations "Global Compact"for IntegratingHuman Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations:Lessons from European Integration, 13

EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 621 (2002). For an extensive list of Petersmann's publications on this subject prior
to 2002, see Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A
Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUROPEAN J. INT'i. L. 815, n3 (2002).
4 For a particularly harsh critique, see Alston, supra note 3. For other critiques, see Robert Howse
and Kalypso Nicolaides, Legitimacy Through "HigherLaw"? Why Constitutionalizingthe WTO is a Step
Too Far, in THOMAS COTnER AND PvrROS MAVROIDIS, EDS., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE: LESSONS FOR THE

WTO (2002); Steve Peers, FundamentalRight or PoliticalWhim? WTO Law and the European Court of
Justice, in GRAINNE DE BJRCA AND JOANNE Sco'rr, EDS., THE EU AND THE WTO (2001).

5 See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, WTO DisputeSettlement and Human Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 753,
755 (2002) ("Unless otherwise prescribed, WTO provisions must evolve and be interpreted consistently
with international law, including human rights law . . . . [A] good faith interpretation of the relevant
WTO and human rights provisions should lead to a reading of WTO law coherent with human rights
law.").
6 Cf Marcia Harpaz, When East Meets West: Approximation of Laws in the EU-Mediterranean
Context, 43 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 993, 999 (2006) (discussing the EU's expectation that its Mediterranean neighbors will unilaterally align their legislation in certain respects to that of the EU rather than
the parties engaging in a "give and take" negotiation).
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text, many developing countries have acceded to the demands of developed countries by agreeing to some form of human rights obligations. 7
There have been a variety of efforts to discipline human rights through trade
agreements. In some cases, provisions are included that make specific reference
to "human rights." The European Union has long included such human rights
clauses in its agreements.8 Other agreements include chapters or other provisions
that, while not using the term "human rights," are nonetheless linked to an objective that can be seen as human rights-related. Examples include provisions requiring the parties to abide by International Labor Organization treaties. 9 Many
FTAs, including all FTAs entered into by the United States, include labor-related
provisions - sometimes in the form of an entire chapter.' 0 FTAs with provisions
designed to protect indigenous peoples and their innovations arguably also fit
into this category. Some provisions are designed to reserve the right to take measures to further the interests of indigenous peoples, even if doing so results in
giving better treatment to a segment of the domestic population than is accorded
to the trading partner. New Zealand includes such provisions in its FTAs, designed to preserve the policy space necessary to comply with its obligations to
Maori pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi.'I Other agreements include provisions
relating to the protection of traditional knowledge.1 2 Examples include the China
- New Zealand FTA, which provides that the parties may, subject to their respective international obligations, "establish appropriate measures to protect genetic
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore."' 3
7

See, e.g., EMu.,im

HAFNER-BURToN,

FoRCED

'ro BE4 Gooi: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTs

BooST

HUMAN RIGHTs, 4 (2009).

8 See,

e.g., LORAND

BARTELs, HUMAN

RIGHTS

CONDRIIONALIfY

IN THE

EU's

INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS (Oxford 2005).

9 For example, the labor chapter in the United States - Peru FTA establishes a number of obligations
to comply with ILO obligations. See United States - Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (2006), ch. 17,
particularly Arts. 17.1-17.3, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftal
peru/asset-upload-file73_9496.pdf.
10 For a discussion of the range of labor provisions in FTAs to which the United States is a party, see
David A. Gantz, Labor Rights and EnvironmentalProtection Under NAFTA and other U.S. Free Trade
Agreements, 42 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. Riv. 297 (2011).

I See, e.g., New Zealand - Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (entered into force
Jul. 1, 2005), Art. 15.8, para. I ("Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Party or as a disguised restriction on trade in goods
and services or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the adoption by New Zealand of
measures it deems necessary to accord more favourable treatment to Maori in respect of matters covered
by this Agreement including in fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi."). For the full
text of the agreement see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, New Zealand - Thailand
Closer Economic PartnershipAgreement, available at http://www.mfat.govt.nzffrade-and-EconomicRelations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Thailand/Closer-Economic-Partnership-Agreementtext/index.php.
12 "Traditional knowledge" refers to "knowledge, know-how, skills and practices that are developed,
sustained and passed on from generation to generation within a community, often forming part of its
cultural or spiritual identity." See World Intellectual Property Organization, Traditional Knowledge,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/tk/.
13 See New Zealand - China Free Trade Agreement, chapter 12, Art. 165 (entered into force Oct. 1,
2008), available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/l-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-downloads/
NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf. For a discussion of FTA provisions relating to traditional
knowledge, see Susy Frankel, Attempts to Protect Indigenous Culture Through Free Trade Agreements,
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The European Union (EU) has been the most prominent proponent of including human rights clauses in FTAs, having done so for well over twenty years.14
The EU's agreements have generally contained provisions indicating that respect
for human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
constituted "an essential element" of the agreement.' 5 Despite these provisions,
earlier agreements contained no operational language requiring any particular implementing measures to ensure the protection of human rights, nor any enforcement mechanism should human rights be violated.1 6 More recently, the EU has
included implementation provisions that obligate the parties to implement measures necessary for their fulfillment of their FTA obligations, including a human
rights clause. 1 7 Notwithstanding such provisions, the FTAs vary in the degree to
which - if at all - the human rights clauses are subject to the agreements' dispute
settlement provisions. Also, even when dispute settlement is a possibility, the EU
has generally stopped short of exercising its full rights with respect to its trading
partners' human rights violations.' 8 While it is primarily the EU that includes
human rights clauses in its FTAs, the United States and other countries often
include provisions relating to labor rights that can be seen as a type of human
rights provision.' 9 While labor rights abuses can be seen as human rights abuses,
it is not clear that the purposes of labor chapters in FTAs have much to do with
protecting human rights. The motivation for including such clauses is instead to
assuage the concerns of those - particularly Democrats in the United States Congress - who worry that the proposed free trade agreements will lead to a shift in
jobs to developing countries due to lower wages and lax labor standards in those
countries. 20 Thus, the impetus for including labor chapters in FTAs seems to be
the desire to protect, or be seen to be protecting, workers in the developed country instead of protecting workers' rights in the developing country. Given the
motivation for such provisions, we should not be sanguine that their inclusion in
FTAs is a step forward for human rights.

in

CHRISTOPH B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT AND JESSICA C.
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND PoIcY IssuEs (2012).

LAI,

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE

IN

14 See HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 51-52 (describing EU protections of human rights in trade
agreements dating back to the early 1990s).
15 See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, UNrED NATIONS, availableat http://www.un.org/en/
documents/udhr/.
16 Lorand Bartels, Human Rights and Sustainable Development Obligations in EU Free Trade
Agreements, University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 24/2012 (Sept. 2012) at 4, 8.
'7

Id. at 4.

18 Id. at 9.

19 See Zolomphi Nkowani, InternationalTrade and Labour: A Quest for Moral Legitimacy, 8 J.
INT'L TRADE L. & Poi.'Y 4, 10 (2009) (arguing that "is beyond dispute ... that labour rights are human
rights . . . ."). For a discussion of labor clauses in United States FTAs, see Nkowani at 10-11.
20 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 58, 62-64.
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III.
A.

Human Rights and FTAs - Missing the Target?
Effectiveness of Human Rights Provisions in FTAs

Although the EU uses FTAs as a mechanism for imposing human rights provisions on developing countries, and the United States has also included human
rights-related provisions in its FTAs, most commonly relating to labor standards, 2 1 it is unclear whether such provisions go very far towards reducing the
most significant human rights abuses worldwide.
There is some data to suggest the provisions used by the EU and United States
have, in some cases, had positive effects on their FTA partners' compliance with
human rights obligations. 2 2 Of course there is a real question whether it is appropriate or desirable for developed countries to be dictating conditions of behavior
to developing countries. However, if one ascribes to the "the ends justify the
means" school of thought, then FTAs still do not appear to be a particularly
effective instrument for addressing human rights concerns.
The author of a detailed examination of the use of human rights provisions in
trade agreements has concluded the EU and US's motivations in including such
provisions has more to do with politics and other considerations than with any
genuine concern for a positive human rights outcome:
[T]he rise of a human rights discourse should be viewed with at least
some skepticism. . ..Many policymakers may not actually be as invested
in the human rights outcome, or the effects of the policy, as they could
be. . ..And so they may be willing to trade off or sell down certain aspects
of human rights to win a political compromise that seems indefensible to
moral advocates and that could have harmful, and certainly unintended,
effects. 23

Such inconsistencies are evident in developed countries' approaches to trade
agreements with developing countries. The United Nations High Commission for
Human Rights has cautioned developing countries about the potential human
rights implications of adopting intellectual property protections more stringent
than those required under the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), commonly referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions. 2 4 Such provisions include data exclusivity for patented pharmaceuticals,
making it more difficult for less expensive generic medications to compete in the
Nkowani, supra note 19.
See generally HAFNmR-BURTON, supra note 7.
23 HAlWER-BURTON, supra note 7, at 172. See also Stephen Joseph Powell and Patricia Camino Perez, Global Laws, Local Lives: Impact of the New Regionalism on Human Rights Compliance, 17 BupF.
Hum. Rrs. L. REv. 117, 149 (2011) ("[M]any of the human rights provisions negotiated arguably serve
the political and economic agendas of the developed countries rather than the actual concerns of the
regional partners about their failure to implement human rights obligations to the betterment of their civil
societies.").
24 loana Cismas, The Integration of Human Rights in Bilateral and Plurilateral Free Trade Agreements: Arguments for a Coherent Relationship with Reference to the Swiss Context, 21-SUM CURRENTS:
INT'i- TRADE L. J. 3, 6 (2013).
21

22
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marketplace. In the Dominican Republic - Central America - United States FTA
(DR-CAFTA) negotiations, Guatemala in particular attempted to fight against
such provisions, but was unsuccessful. 25 The United States and other developed
countries simultaneously require TRIPS-plus commitments in their FTAs with
developing countries while including provisions requiring various human rights
protections - and sometimes declining to include provisions sought by the developing country to assist in promoting its economy. For example, while the United
States and other developed countries have insisted upon TRIPS-plus provisions
within FTAs, they have largely declined to provide protections for the traditional
knowledge of the developing country partner. 26 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this reflects a preference by developed countries for political rights over economic and
social rights. 27
The culprits are not limited to the United States and European Union. The
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identified an
example of this preference in Switzerland's FTAs. It noted that by requiring its
FTA partners to accede to the International Convention for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants, Switzerland's FTAs could jeopardize its partners' right to
food (on the basis that adherence to the convention may increase the cost of food
production). 28 In the context of the PACER Plus trade negotiations, New Zealand
and Australia have been accused of pressuring Pacific Island countries to increase market access for fatty cuts of meat, alcohol and tobacco products. 29
Developed countries therefore often send a mixed message with respect to
their interest in promoting human rights. Countries appear to push for provisions
that suit their policy preferences, which reflect different priorities in different
countries. The United States includes in its conditions - both in its GSP program
25 Powell and Perez, supra note 23 at 148-49. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Trade Agreements and
Health in Developing Countries, 373 THE LANCET 363, 364 (2009) ("But perhaps the most adverse
consequences for health arise from provisions in trade agreements that are designed to restrict access to
generic medicines. These include . . . the data exclusivity provisions that have become a standard part of
US and European bilateral trade agreements.").
26 Colombia and Peru unsuccessfully sought such protections in their respective FTA negotiations
with the United States. See Powell and Perez, supra note 23, at 146-47.
27 Not all developed countries have insisted on TRIPS-plus provisions. Indeed, Norway refused to
support negotiating for the inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions in the EFTA-India FTA precisely because
it did not wish to impede India's access to affordable medicines. Cismas, supra note 24, at 6.
28 Cismas, supra note 24, at 6.
29 The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) is an umbrella agreement between Australia and New Zealand and the Forum Island Countries that sets out a plan for staged trade
liberalization and cooperation. At present these countries are negotiating "PACER Plus", which will be a
free trade agreement between the Forum Island countries and Australia and New Zealand. See New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
(PACER,) available at http://www.mfat.gov.ws/PACER.html. For a discussion of the potential negative
health implications for the Pacific Islands countries of PACER Plus, see Adam Wolfenden, Health Implications of PACER-Plusfor Pacific Island Countries, Pacific Network on Globalisation (Oct. 14, 2014),
availableat http://pang.org.fj/health-implications-of-pacer-plus-for-pacific-island-countries/ ("Non-communicable diseases are already a major problem for many FICs and commitments under PACER-Plus
could exacerbate this as tariffs are cut. There are concerns that FICs will have their ability to ban the
import of such fatty foods as mutton flaps, turkey tails, as well as food high in sugar content curtailed.");
see also David Legge et al., TRADE AGREEMENTS AND NON-COMMUNICABLE DISEASES IN THE PACIFIC

ISLANDS 10 (2013), available at http://www.who.int/nmh/events/2013/trade-agreement.pdf.
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and its FTAs - provisions relating to the human rights of children, but does not
require that recipient countries outlaw other serious human rights violations, such
as torture or murder. 30 In contrast, the EU has emphasized workers' human rights
in its GSP scheme, but has tended to refer to human rights without specifying
labor rights in its FTAs. 3 1
These contradictory approaches are not limited to GSP programs and FTAs,
but are also evident in bilateral negotiations in connection with new WTO members' protocols of accession. In order to join the WTO, a non-member must attain
the consensus of all existing members that it should be permitted to accede. 32 In
practice this has led to significant demands from the existing membership, particularly the United States, for concessions that go beyond the terms of the WTO
Agreements.3 3 These "WTO-plus" requests are de facto requirements if the nonmember wishes to receive the consensus it needs to become a member. These
demands may do damage to the would-be member's development interests. For
example, as a condition of Samoa's accession to the WTO, the United States
required Samoa to lift its existing restrictions on the importation of turkey tails, a
cheap and very fatty product that is treated as a waste product in Samoa, which
has the world's highest percentage of obesity. Samoa had its measures in place to
make this unhealthy product less accessible. However, just as Australia and New
Zealand did for mutton flaps, the United States saw a market opportunity and
seized upon it.34
Nevertheless, demands made in the context of WTO accession may be directed at rectifying deficiencies in judicial independence, affording legal protections for individuals and businesses, providing avenues for public participation in
proposed rule-making, and other changes directed at improving transparency and
reducing the potential for corruption in domestic regulatory and judicial
processes.35 Thus, some aspects of the WTO accession process are likely to lead
to improvements in human rights.
B.

Lack of Capture of Worst Offenders

Unfortunately, even if human rights provisions in existing FTAs are having
positive effects, these agreements are not reaching the most significant human
30 HAFNER-BURTON,

supra note 7 at 10.

31 Id. at 10, 12.
32 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,

Apr. 15, 1994 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, Art. XII [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; see also WTO, Accessions, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acce/acce.htm ("Any state or customs territory having full
autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may become a member ("accede to") the WTO, but all
WTO members must agree on the terms.").
33 See, e.g., Julia Ya Qin, 'WTO-Plus' Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
483 (2003).
34 See, e.g., Samoa Rewarded for Turkey Tail Turnaround, SAMOA OuSRveR (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.samoaobserver.ws/local-news/otherlbusiness/1314-samoa-rewarded-for-turkey-tailturnaround.
35 See, e.g., Susan Ariel Aaronson and M. Rodman Abouharb, Unexpected Bedfellows: The GATT,
the WTO and Some Democratic Rights, 55 INT'L. STUD. Q. 1, 7-8 (2011).
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rights abuses. Those abuses are not disciplined or addressed by the vast majority
of free trade agreements, even those containing human rights provisions. This is
because the worst human rights offenders largely do not participate in international trade agreements, including the WTO and FTAs.
Given the broad range of human rights instruments, it is not always evident
what types of abuses are occurring when "human rights violations" are discussed
in broad terms. 3 6 Nonetheless, various organizations and the press have catalogued countries in order to identify the most egregious violators of human
rights. Although it is not clear what criteria were applied to create these rankings,
which are not identical from list to list, there are significant overlaps. Two such
lists are provided here as illustrative examples. What is striking about these lists
is how few of the listed countries are members of the WTO.37
According to the Christian Science Monitor, in 2013, the world's worst human
rights violators were: 3 8
Tibet (not a WTO member)
Uzbekistan (not a WTO member)
Turkmenistan (not a WTO member)
Sudan (not a WTO member)
Somalia (not a WTO member)
North Korea (not a WTO member)
Libya (not a WTO member)
Eritrea (not a WTO member)
Equatorial Guinea (not a WTO member)
Myanmar (is a WTO member)
The worst violators in 2014, according to Human Rights Risk Atlas, are: 3 9
Syria (not a WTO member)
Sudan (not a WTO member)
DR Congo (is a WTO member)
Pakistan (is a WTO member)
Somalia (not a WTO member)
Afghanistan (not a WTO member)
Iraq (not a WTO member)
Myanmar (is a WTO member)
Yemen (not a WTO member)
Nigeria (is a WTO member)
There are a few overlaps on these lists, with Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan
appearing on both. However, of the seventeen different countries listed, only four
36 It is likely that the abuses garnering the most attention are violations of civil and political rights
rather than economic, social or cultural rights. See Mutua, supra note 2.
37 The status of each country as a WTO member or not is indicated in parenthesis following the
country's name.
38 World's Worst Human Rights Violators, CHRISTIAN ScIENCE MONrroR (Nov. 7, 2013), http://

www.csmonitor.com/Photo-Galleries/Lists/World-s-worst-human-rights-violators#279281.
39 Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, Human Rights Risk Atlas 2014, MAPLECROir GLoBA. RISK
ANALYrics, http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2013/12/04/70-increase-countries-identifiedextreme-risk-human-rights-2008-bhuman-rights-risk-atlas-2014b/.
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- Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Democratic Republic of Congo - are members of the WTO, and only one WTO member, Myanmar, appears on both lists.
There is also a correlation between corruption and the fulfillment of human
rights. 4 0 In particular, "[t]he protection of human rights is inversely affected by
the presence of corruption in a society." 4 1It has even been argued that corruption
can itself be a direct violation of human rights. 4 2
Given the connection between corruption and human rights abuses, the most
corrupt countries likely have significant human rights issues as well. Transparency International measures the perceived levels of corruption in countries
worldwide, based on expert opinion. In the 2013 study, the ten countries perceived to have the highest levels of corruption (from worst to tenth-worst)
were: 4 3

Somalia (not a WTO member)
North Korea (not a WTO member)
Afghanistan (not a WTO member)
Sudan (not a WTO member)
South Sudan (not a WTO member)
Libya (not a WTO member)
Iraq (not a WTO member)
Uzbekistan (not a WTO member)
Turkmenistan (not a WTO member)
Syria (not a WTO member)
It is striking that not a single one of the most corrupt countries is a member of the
WTO.
There is also a correlation between human rights violations and corruption on
the one hand and lack of participation in FTAs on the other. There are numerous
FTAs in existence between a developed country on the one hand and a developing country on the other, and many of these contain human rights-related obligations. However, such agreements tend not to be with the worst human rights
abusers,44 which suggests such agreements may be of limited value in addressing
human rights issues. The vast majority of FTAs WTO members enter into are
40 See United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.Doc. A/RES/58/4
(Oct.
31, 2003) (taking the view that corruption is adversely related to the realization of human rights).
41 James Thuo Gathii, Defining the Relationshipbetween Human Rights and Corruption,31 U. PA.
J.
lmr'i L. 125, 147 (2009).
42 Julio Bacio Terracino, Corruption as a Violation of Human Rights, (Int'l Council on Human
Rights Policy Working Paper 2008), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/150/13l1_terracinoen
2008.pdf.

43 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAiL, http://www.transparency
.org/cpi2013/results (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
44 There are numerous South-South FTAs; however, such agreements are often between neighboring
countries with similar factor endowments and export portfolios, meaning that the gains from trade
achieved by such agreements are likely to be modest. See JAMES THUO GATHIi, AFRICAN REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS As LEGAL REGIMEs (2011) at 8 (noting this to be the case in the context of African
FTAs).
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with other WTO members. 4 5 The WTO rules dictate this dynamic. Under the
rules, WTO members must give each other most-favored nation (MFN) status;
MFN requires a WTO member to give to every other WTO member treatment
that is at least as good as that given to any other country. 4 6 Thus, in the absence
of an applicable exception, WTO members should treat all other WTO members
the same without favoring any particular trading partner over the others. The
MFN requirement applies, inter alia, to tariff rates. 4 7 Therefore, a WTO member's tariff rate on a given line of its tariff schedule should be the same for all
WTO member-exporting countries. Furthermore, because MFN requires that
WTO members give each other the best treatment given to "any other country,"
any preferential treatment given to a non-WTO member must be extended "immediately and unconditionally" to all WTO members. 4 8
There are a number of exceptions to the MFN rule. 4 9 For our purposes, the
most significant one is GATT Article XXIV, which provides that WTO members
may enter into FTAs (and customs unions) with each other without extending the
provisions of such agreements on an MFN basis to other WTO members, so long
as certain criteria are satisfied. 50 In other words, the MFN obligation does not
apply to Article XXIV-compliant FTAs. Thus, the parties to an FTA falling
within the scope of Article XXIV do not need to extend to other WTO members
the favorable treatment they grant to one another. With respect to the scope of
Article XXIV, the text provides in relevant part that customs unions and FTAs
are permitted "as between the territories of contracting parties" if certain elaborated conditions are satisfied. 5 ' Thus, it appears that FTAs between a WTO member and a non-WTO member would not fall within the Article XXIV exception to
the MFN obligation. Accordingly, if a WTO member entered into such an FTA,
it would be obligated to extend to its fellow WTO members any provisions in the
FTA that were more favorable than the treatment being provided prior to the
45 The WTO maintains a Regional Trade Agreements Information System, which includes an online
list of all FTAs that have been notified to the WTO. WTO, Welcome to the Regional Trade Agreements
Information System (RTA-IS), http://rtais.wto.org/Ul/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx (last updated Jan.
15, 2015).
46 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-ll, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. I
[hereinafter GATT].
47 GATT Art. 1:1.
48 Id.

49 The exceptions to the most-favored nation principle are pervasive, so much so that MFN has been
termed "least favored nation" or LFN, as countries give better than the MFN rate to so many other WTO
members. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, The Law, Economics and Politics of PreferentialTradingArrangements: An Introduction,46 STAN. J. INT'iL L. 171 (2010). For a discussion of this phenomenon, see The
Futureof the WTO, Report by the ConsultativeBoard to Director-GeneralSupachaiPanitchpakdi(2005)
("the Sutherland Report") at 19-21, availableat http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/lOanniv-e/future_
wto e.pdf. The Sutherland Report references the particularly stark example of the European Union,
which at the time of publication in 2005 gave better than MFN treatment to all WTO members except for
nine (Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore
and the United States). The case of the EU has since become even more noteworthy as it has since
concluded an FTA with Korea and is currently negotiating FTAs with Canada, Japan, Singapore, and the
United States.
50 GATT Art. XXIV.
51 GATT Art. XXIV:5.
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creation of the FTA. For this reason, the vast majority of FTAs are amongst
WTO members. 52
C.

Not in Developing Countries' Best Interests

Bilateral FTAs between a developed country and a developing country often
contain provisions that the developing country does not consider attractive, including human rights provisions, TRIPS-plus intellectual property obligations,
and labor and environmental commitments. 53 While developing countries have
successfully fended off these types of provisions for possible inclusion in WTO
agreements, they are nonetheless willing to agree to them in a one-on-one negotiating context. 54 The bilateral negotiating context is therefore viewed as less
favorable overall for developing countries than the WTO, where the developing
countries are in the majority and can block the negotiation of agreements or
terms that they find objectionable.5 5
In addition, negotiating FTAs takes time and resources, which are then not
available to apply in the context of WTO negotiations. This has been a negative
development for poorer WTO members - a trend that is likely to get worse, as
discussed below.
D.

Trend Towards FTAs that Exclude the Poorer WTO Members

Currently a new wrinkle is emerging with respect to FTAs that suggests even
more strongly that the WTO is the better forum for developing countries. Previously, FTAs were primarily bilateral, no more ambitious than the WTO in terms
of commitments, and often included developing countries. The world's economic
powerhouses were not pairing with each other, but with countries with which
they saw a benefit - perhaps for political or other non-economic strategic reasons
- to allying. Now, however, the trend in FTAs seems to be towards multi-party
agreements with high-standards objectives that by and large do not include the
poorest WTO members.
Until recently, FTAs were primarily: between neighboring or closely proximate countries; between a developed and a developing country; covering similar
52 There are some exceptions. For example, some WTO members have entered into customs unions
or free trade agreements with neighboring non-WTO member countries. In most such cases, the nonWTO member is in the process of WTO accession.
53 See, e.g., Arie Reich, Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in International Economic Law: Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity, 60 U. TORONTo L.J. 263, 287 (2010).
54 See generally HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 7; Frederick M. Abbott, A New Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism a Threat?, 10 J. INT'i. EcON L. 571, 583 (2007) ("weaker actors have a
better chance to have their voices heard, and their policy choices taken into account" in the multilateral
consensus-based system). Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'. L. 639 (1997-1998) (discussing
similar phenomenon in context of BITs).
55 See, e.g., David Kinley and Hai Nguyen, Viet Nam, Human Rights and Trade: Implications of Viet
Nam's Accession to the WTO 40 (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Working Paper No. 39 2008) (difficulties in
WTO negotiations "can, and has, lead to an upsurge in the negotiation of bi-lateral trade agreements
which inevitably favour the powerful over the weak and dilute the overall protective reach (albeit limited)
of multi-lateral agreements such as the WTO").
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topics to the WTO; and/or between a superpower and a much smaller developed
country. Thus, the major economies were entering into FTAs with a variety of
trading partners, but not with each other. There is currently no FTA between any
two of the United States, European Union, China or Japan, nor between any two
of Japan, China and South Korea. However, this dynamic is changing rapidly. At
present the United States and the European Union are negotiating the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP);5 6 the United States and Japan
are negotiating an FTA along with ten other countries in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations;57 and Japan, China and South Korea are all engaged
in the sixteen-country negotiations to form the Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership (RCEP).5 8 In tandem, China, Japan and Korea are negotiating
a trilateral FTA, known as "CJK", and China and Korea have all but wrapped up
bilateral FTA negotiations. Thus, much of the FTA momentum consists of the
largest economies finally pairing up, rather than linkages with poorer countries.
In addition, there has been a recent move towards pursuing broader and deeper
economic integration efforts within FTAs. While many previous FTAs largely
tracked the subject matters of the WTO, more recently, FTAs and other trade
agreement negotiations have increasingly included subjects that are outside the
scope of the WTO. For example, the TPP, mentioned above, has been characterized by the parties as a "twenty-first century trade agreement". 59 While the exact
meaning of this term is unclear, it seems to refer to both the breadth and depth of
the agreement. 60 In terms of depth, it is understood that there will be no a priori
exclusions of any tariff lines from the trade in goods coverage. 6 1 This differs
from most FTAs which tend to provide carve-outs for anywhere from a relatively
small to quite a large number of tariff lines associated with products seen as
sensitive or otherwise of particular importance to one or more of the participating
countries. 62 While it remains to be seen whether the TPP will indeed include
56 See TransatlanticTrade and Investment Partnership,OF1FCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
availableat http://www.ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
57 See Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE oiF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/tpp (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
58 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), Regional Comprehensive Economic
PartnershipNegotiations, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/.
59 See Trans-Pacific PartnershipLeaders Statement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

(Nov. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/201 I/november/
trans-pacific-partnership-leaders-statement.
60 Addressing this question is one of the primary objectives of a recent book. See THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT (C.L. Lim, Deborah Elms

and Patrick Low, eds.) (Cambridge 2012).
61 See, e.g., Outlines of the Trans-PacificPartnershipAgreement, OFIPCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRE-

(Nov. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/
november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement ("The TPP tariff schedule will cover all goods,
representing some 11,000 tariff lines.") [hereinafter USTR TPP Fact Sheet].
62 The agricultural sector in particular is often carved out in whole or in part. See, e.g., Warren
Maruyama, PreferentialTrade Agreements and the Erosion of the WTO's MFN Principle, 46 STAN. J.
INT'i L. 177, 190 (2010) (discussing the phenomenon of FTAs with major sectoral exclusions); Matthew
Schaefer, Ensuring That Regional Trade Agreements Complement the WTO System: U.S. Unilateralisma
Supplement to WTO Initiatives?, 10 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 585, 570 (2007) (discussing the tendency to exclude agriculture from FTAs); Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, ConSENTATIVE
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commitments to remove tariffs on every single tariff line, it is unusual in even
professing that such an outcome would be desirable. 63 With respect to breadth,
the TPP will address several areas that generally have not been covered by FTAs.
These include provisions dealing with regulatory coherence; supply chain management; state-owned enterprises; small- and medium-sized enterprises; and ecommerce. 64 In addition, the TPP will have chapters addressing environmental
protection and labor standards.6 5 Consistent with many United States FTAs, the
provisions of these chapters may be subject to binding dispute settlement. While
this is a common feature of United States FTAs, most other countries only apply
hortatory or "best endeavors" language to describe any FTA text pertaining to
protecting the environment or guaranteeing labor rights.
At the same time that the largest economies are negotiating FTAs with one
another, larger groupings of countries are also in the process of negotiating sector-specific plurilateral agreements such as the Trade in Services Agreement
(TiSA). 66 These negotiations are endeavors to incorporate broader subject matter
coverage and deeper liberalization than is presently covered by the WTO Agreements, particularly in sectors involving rapidly evolving technologies. Countries
that produce technology are finding the GATS increasingly anachronistic given
its outdated services definitions and categories. 67 The poorest WTO members,
which generally do not produce technology, have not sought to participate in
these negotiations. 68 This dynamic, coupled with the lack of progress in concluding the Doha Round, has led coalitions of the willing to negotiate on their own.
Because these plurilateral negotiations comprise like-minded countries interested
in accelerating trade liberalization, the discussions are unlikely to involve much,
stitutional,and PoliticalConstraints,98 AM. J. INrr'i. L. 247, 268 (2004) (noting that many of the EC's
FTAs exclude agriculture).
63 It is difficult to imagine that this will be the case due to a few extreme sensitivities, the most
notable of which is Japan's tariff on rice. The most likely scenario is that rice would be included, but that
Japan's obligations to lower tariffs would consist of something short of reducing such tariffs to zero over
a given time period. Instead, the agreement could call for Japan to lower its tariffs over time, but perhaps
not remove them entirely. See, e.g., Tariff Agreement with the U.S. Stands in Way of TPP, THE JAPAN
TiMEs (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/02/national/tariff-disagreement-with-us-stands-in-way-of-tpp/#.UOYG26L6r6M (noting that of five categories of farm products Japan is trying
to shelter from tariff cuts, the U.S. has insisted on comprehensive tariff removal for four categories, but
has "shown signs of being flexible on giving exceptional treatment to rice").
6 See, e.g., Embassies of Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore & Vietnam, Trans Pacific Partnership:a 21st Century Agreement, availableat http://www.usnzcouncil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/ 1/TPP-at-a-glance.pdf.
65 See USTR TPP Fact Sheet, supra note 61.
66 See Shin-yi Peng, Is the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) a Stepping Stone for the Next Version
of GATS? 43 HONG KONG L.J. 611 (2013); Coalition of Services Industries, The Trade in Services
Agreement (TISA), available at https://servicescoalition.org/negotiations/trade-in-services-agreement.
67 Peng, supra note 66 at 611.
68 The current TiSA participants are Australia; Canada; Chile; Chinese Taipei; Colombia; Costa
Rica; the European Union; Hong Kong (China); Iceland; Israel; Japan; Liechtenstein; New Zealand;
Norway; Mexico; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; South Korea; Switzerland; Turkey; and the United
States. The parties have made clear that other WTO members that share the group's objectives are welcome to join the negotiations. See Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, Trade in Services
Agreement (TISA), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
topics-domaines/services/tisa-acs.aspx?lang=eng.
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if any, discussion of special and differential treatment for developing countries.
This is a significant difference from the WTO context. Within the WTO, the
principle of special and differential treatment is well-established, and is reflected
in, inter alia, developing countries being subject to more lenient provisions and
longer phase-in periods for a variety of commitments. 69 While the WTO process
is imperfect, and much ink has been spilled over the failure of WTO members to
deliver on the Doha Development Agenda, which had been promised in exchange
for the Uruguay Round Agreements, developing countries nonetheless have a
greater voice and have achieved far more concessions within the WTO's multilateral process than in any other trade agreement context.
Due to the size of the economies involved, these new agreements have more
potential than previous FTAs to set the terms for future multilateral trade agreements. Yet developing countries, particularly poorer ones, are largely absent
from this new generation of FTAs. The TPP includes a number of developing
countries - most notably Vietnam - but, unlike the WTO, does not appear to be
designed to include less significant commitments or other special and differential
treatment provisions for these countries. 70 Sector-specific plurilateral trade agreements such as TiSA may address technologies in which poorer countries are not
actively participating. As such, the less-developed countries are not needed to
obtain a "critical mass".
IV.
A.

The WTO and Human Rights
WTO Membership Correlated with Improved Human Rights Records

The data cited above suggested that not one of the ten most corrupt countries
is a member of the WTO. As a result, there appears to be a significant correlation
between human rights abuses and corruption on the one hand, and lack of WTO
membership on the other. But does WTO membership "cure" the corruption and
human rights abuses? Many commentators have critiqued the WTO in particular
and globalization more broadly for their role in contributing to income inequality
within countries. 7' Nonetheless, even amongst those who express reservations
about trade liberalization, many have conducted case studies and determined that
in many instances joining the WTO has contributed to an improvement in human
rights and a decrease in corruption. For example, Aaronson and Abouharb found
a positive correlation between respect for democratic rights and GATT/WTO
membership, with the level of respect for such rights increasing in tandem with
69 See WTO, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop e/devele/dev-special_differential_provisionse.htm.
7o See, e.g., Deborah Kay Elms, Trans-Pacific PartnershipTrade Negotiations: Some Outstanding
Issues for the Final Stretch, 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEArH L. & Pot'y 379, 396 (2013) ("RCEP
explicitly allows special and differential treatment for developing economies, while the TPP does not.").
71 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. Rizv. 1573, 1576 (2000) (linking globalization with increased income inequality); Joel R. Paul, Do InternationalTrade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT'L. L. 285, 288 (2003) (concluding that globalization has increased income inequality
within, and amongst, countries). For a critique of the critics, see Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquing the
Critics of Economic Globalization, I J. INT'L L. & INr'i- REL. 213, 220-26 (2005).
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the length of GATT/WTO membership. 72 They provide examples indicating that
both the WTO accession process and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism have
played important roles in these improvements, as these processes provide other
members with the opportunity to identify problems such as lack of transparency,
failure to provide the opportunity for democratic participation in various
processes, and partiality in regulatory or other processes affecting businesses.73
Kinley and Nguyen have similarly determined that Vietnam's human rights record has improved since its accession to the WTO. 7 4
Accordingly, a better path towards protecting human rights may be to promote
WTO membership and to facilitate developing country participation within the
WTO, particularly in WTO negotiations. If this is accepted, it should be seen as a
positive that many least-developed countries (LDCs) were founding members of
the WTO, and several others (Cambodia, Cape Verde, Laos, Nepal and Yemen)
have joined since the WTO's inception.7 5 Nonetheless, the WTO accession process can be extremely lengthy and challenging, with some countries abandoning
the process before achieving membership. 76
B.

Developing Countries Get More of a Say

Developing countries are better able to negotiate for redistributive or other
welfare-enhancing measures in the context of the WTO than in a bilateral agreement. Although developing countries have sometimes been disappointed with the
WTO as a forum for progressing their interests, the WTO is nonetheless a preferable avenue for developing countries than bilateral FTAs. First, within the WTO,
developing countries have the ability to use their numbers to their advantage in
promoting certain agendas and putting a halt to others. A significant majority of
the WTO's 160 members 77 comprises developing and least developed countries.7 8 As a result of the developing countries' demands, the WTO agreements
contain many different provisions that reflect the principle of "special and differential treatment" for developing countries.7 9
See Aaronson and Abouharb, supra note 35.
Id.
74 Kinley and Nguyen, supra note 55.
72

73

75 See WTO, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e.
htm (detailing a complete list of WTO members, including dates of accession).
76 See UNCTAD, The Least Developed CountriesReport: Linking InternationalTrade with Poverty
Reduction, (2004) chapter 3 (discussing LDC accession to the WTO) available at http://unctad.org/en/
docs/ldc2004_en.pdf.
77 There were 160 members as of Jul. 20, 2014. Yemen is the newest WTO member, having ratified
its Protocol of Accession earlier this year. See WTO, Yemen to Become 160th WTO Member (May 27,
2014), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news 14_e/acc.yem_27may l4_.e.htm.
78 The WTO website indicates that over two-thirds of Members are developing countries. WTO,
Trade and Development, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-eldevel-eldevele.htm.
79 The WTO Secretariat has periodically prepared compilations of the various special and differential
treatment provisions. For the most recent version see WTO, Implementation of Special and Differential
Treatment Provisionsin WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W77 (Oct. 25, 2000), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/devel-e/d2legle.htm.
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The 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference outcomes reflect the impact of developing countries banding together within the WTO. The Bali package includes several notable decisions of interest to developing countries, including an
Agreement on Trade Facilitation;80 an interim agreement relating to the stockpiling of food for food security purposes; 8 ' and a pledge to improve the level of
duty-free and quota-free market access provided to least developing countries. 82
C.

The WTO as a Space to Address Some Human Rights Concerns

1.

Power in Numbers

While developing countries can band together in the WTO context, negotiating
a bilateral FTA presents a very different dynamic. When a relatively poor country negotiates an FTA with a wealthy one, the inequality in bargaining power
unsurprisingly results in the developed country largely dictating terms to the developing country. This can result in developing countries individually agreeing to
terms - such as intellectual property provisions that go beyond those required by
the WTO's TRIPS Agreement - that they have collectively resisted within the
WTO context.8 3 Indeed, within the WTO, the least developed countries have
been able to postpone their implementation of TRIPS since the inception of the
organization. At present, LDCs will not have to implement TRIPS until 2021 at
the earliest. 84
A further benefit for developing countries is the WTO's practice of decisionmaking by consensus. The strong preference for consensus means that even small
countries can, in theory, block certain actions. While in practice a poor country
standing alone is unlikely to stand in the way of measures to which all other
members either agree or are acquiescent, developing countries have successfully
influenced the WTO negotiating agenda. For example, in 1996, the Singapore
Ministerial Conference included a number of items on a proposed negotiating
agenda that were widely viewed as of interest to developed countries, but not to
developing ones.85 Due to the opposition of developing countries, the so-called
80 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WTIMIN(13)/36,
WTIL/911 (11 December 2013).
81 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes, WT/
MIN(13)/38, WT/L/913 (11 December 2013).
82 Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013, Duty-Free and Quota-Free Market Access for LeastDeveloped Countries, WT/MIN(13)/44, WTIL/919 (Dec. I1, 2013).
83 See, e.g., Richard Baldwin, Simon Evenett and Patrick Low, Beyond Tariffs: Multilateralizing
Non-Tariff RTA Commitments, in RICHARD BALDWIN AND PATRICK Low, n1S., MULTILATERALIZING RuGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING SysTnM 89 (2009) ("[Ilt is striking that many WTO
members [have] accepted RTAs that include disciplines whose discussion they firmly rejected at the
multilateral level.").
8 Pursuant to TRIPS Art. 66.1, LDCs were given a ten-year transition period from the entry into
force of the WTO before they would need to implement the bulk of TRIPS' obligations. This transition
period was extended by the WTO membership in November 2005 to July 2013, and again in July 2013
until July 2021. See Decision of the Councilfor TRIPS of 29 November 2005, IP/C/40 and Decision of
the Councilfor TRIPS of 11 June 2013, IP/C/64.
85 The Marrakesh Agreement provides that the WTO membership shall meet as the Ministerial Conference at least once every two years. Marrakesh Agreement Art. IV: 1. The Ministerial Conference is the
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"Singapore issues" - competition policy, investment, transparency in government
procurement and trade facilitation - were not included in the negotiating
agenda.86
Thus, the WTO presents a better opportunity than do FTAs for developing
countries to weigh in on topics that have human rights impacts.
2.

GSP

An additional avenue under the WTO framework for human rights concerns to
be addressed is to grant and withhold preferential tariff treatment through Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes. The WTO rules provide for an
exception to the MFN principle for preferential treatment given to developing
countries pursuant to GSP programs. In 1979, the GATT contracting parties
adopted the Enabling Clause,8 7 which permits GATT (and now WTO) signatories to grant preferential treatment to developing countries under GSP schemes
without extending that treatment on an MFN basis to all WTO members. 88 Such
programs must be generalized, meaning that there should be some form of universal or neutral criteria to determine which countries are eligible, with like preferences being applied to similarly situated countries. 89 Thus, it is not acceptable
to give lower tariffs solely to one's former colonies, but it would be permissible,
for example, to give preferences to all countries below a certain income threshold. 90 Although the Enabling Clause is silent as to whether developed countries
may condition their GSP programs on actions to be taken or abstained from on
the part of the would-be recipients, it has been a widespread practice of GSPhighest decision-making body of the WTO. See WTO, MinisterialConferences, available at http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/ministe.htm. There have been nine Ministerial Conferences since the
WTO's inception; Singapore was the first. Id. Prior to the Singapore Ministerial, many of the WTO's
developed-country members pushed for the Ministerial to launch negotiations on a number of topics. Due
to the objections of developing country members, new negotiations were not initiated. Instead, the Ministerial established working groups to consider the so-called Singapore issues. See SingaporeMinisterial
Declaration,WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996), paras. 20-22.
86 The resistance of developing countries led to a compromise whereby Ministers only agreed to
establish working groups to study the issues surrounding these four topics. See Singapore Ministerial
Declaration,WTO Doc WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec. 18, 1996), [20]-[22].
87 Differential and more favorable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of developing countries, Decision of 28 November 1979, GATT Doc. L/4903.
88 GSP originated from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
1968. See Gerhard Erasmus, Accommodating Developing Countriesin the WTO: From Mega-Debatesto
Economic PartnershipAgreements, in DEBRA P. STEGER, ED., REDESIGNING THE WORU) TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR TIHE TWENiTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010).

89 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Conditionsfor Granting TariffPreferences
to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/ABIR para. 173 (Apr. 7, 2004) ("[The Enabling Clause] does not
prohibit developed-country Members from granting different tariffs to products originating in different
GSP beneficiaries, provided that such differential tariff treatment meets the remaining conditions in the
Enabling Clause. In granting such differential tariff treatment, however, preference-granting countries are
required, by virtue of the term 'nondiscriminatory', to ensure that identical treatment is available to all
similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the 'development, financial and trade needs' to which the treatment in question is intended to respond.").
90 Id. Such schemes sometimes include preferential treatment for non-WTO members, particularly
LDCs. For the list of the recipients to the European Union's "Everything but Arms" program, see, e.g.,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/december/tradoc_150164.pdf.
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granting countries to impose such conditions. 9 ' Conditions are imposed in two
contexts. First, the GSP program as a whole may only be available to countries
satisfying certain criteria, such as complying with human rights or other international obligations. 9 2 Second, some GSP-grantors have a base-level GSP program
available to all developing countries (often subject to a GDP ceiling), but then
provide additional so-called "GSP-plus" preferences to countries meeting specified criteria. 9 3 Under both contexts, developed countries have used the threat of
removing GSP or GSP-plus treatment as a stick to encourage developing countries to, inter alia,comply with human rights obligations. 94 At the same time, the
ability to obtain the basic and/or heightened preferences is held out as a carrot to
developing countries. Recently, the United States suspended its grant of GSP to
Bangladesh as a result of the highly-publicized tragedies resulting in the deaths
of over a thousand Bangladeshi garment factory workers. President Obama announced the suspension, stating Bangladesh "is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights." 9 5
Developing countries have discounted the value of the favorable treatment
they receive from GSP programs due to developed countries erecting new trade
barriers (such as voluntary export restraints) and excluding key products from
their GSP schemes. 96 One of the problems with GSP schemes is that the grantor
country often grants preferences on primary products while excluding further
manufactured products that use the primary product as an input. For example,
unprocessed cocoa beans may be subject to preferential tariff rates, while chocolate products such as chocolate bars will not be.9 7 This creates unfortunate incentives for poor countries. It would be better from a development standpoint to shift
from heavy emphasis on farming and exporting primary products to a trade portfolio that included further manufacturing of those primary products. Further manufacturing is where the product is transformed from a commodity into a far more
valuable (in terms of the price it will command) product. Yet when GSP programs give preferential tariff treatment to raw materials and commodities, but not
to value-added products, it is understandable that GSP recipients continue to pro91 See, e.g., Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic
Integration, 5 YAI. HUM. RTS. & Div. L.J. 1, 53 (2002).
92 See Susan Aronson, Seeping in Slowly: How Human Rights Concerns are Penetratingthe WTO, 6
WORLD T.R. 413, 428-29 (2007).

93

Id. at 429.

94 The United States links GSP status to the provision of workers' rights. The EU links certain incentives to compliance with a subset of the ILO Conventions. See HAFNER-BUR[ON, supra note 7 at 9, n. 11.
95 U.S. Suspends Trade Preferences Program for Bangladesh, GLooALPosT (Jun. 28, 2013), http://
www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/130628/us-suspends-trade-preferencesprogram-bangladesh. See also U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman Comments on President's
Decision to Suspend GSP Benefits for Bangladesh, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRAD REPRESENTATIVE (Jun.
2013), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/june/michael-froman-gsp-bangla
desh.
96 RonnRT E. HUDEc, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 78 (1987).

97 See, e.g., Matthew G. Snyder, Note, GSP and Development: Increasing the Effectiveness of
NonreciprocalPreferences, 33 MICH. J. INiL L. 821, n. 166 (2012).
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duce primary products and that such products form the bulk of their exports to
developed countries."8
While developing countries may be dissatisfied to some degree with the conditionality of GSP programs, they do appear to provide a mechanism for developed
countries to discipline human rights abuses.
3.

GAT Exceptions

i.

Article XX

WTO members may also be able to influence adherence to human rights obligations through the use of the GATT Article XX exceptions, in particular XX(a)
allowing measures "necessary to protect public morals." 99 Article XX(a) has not
been invoked frequently, and it is unclear how broadly its terms can be stretched.
However, the recent EC - Seal Products case may signal a willingness on the
part of the WTO Appellate Body to interpret "public morals" broadly. In the Seal
Products dispute, the dispute settlement Panel and the Appellate Body both accepted the EU's contention that its ban on imported seal products was "necessary
to protect public morals" under Article XX(a).im While Seal Products related to
animal welfare rather than human rights, this decision seems to open the door to
import restrictions based on human rights violations. In particular, it is arguably
incongruous to allow import restrictions based on a moral objection to inhumane
slaughter methods of seals, but to prohibit such restrictions based on a moral
objection to violations of fundamental human rights (such as child labor). 0 1
ii.

Article XXI

An additional possibility is the use of the GATT Article XXI Security exceptions. Article XXI allows a WTO Member to refrain from complying with WTO
obligations through a self-judging provision that a Member State can invoke
whenever "it considers" a measure to be "necessary for the protection of its essential security interests."' 0 2 This language is then limited by requirements that
98 See JAMES THuo GATHii, AFRICAN REGIONAL., TRADE AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL
(2011) (noting that African countries primarily export unprocessed raw materials).
99 GATT Art. XX(a).

REGIMEs

9-10

100 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Prohibitingthe Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted June 18, 2014, para. 5.201 ("Accordingly, we
find that the Panel did not err in concluding that the objective of the EU Seal Regime falls within the
scope of Article XX(a) of the GATTr 1994."); see also Panel Report, European Communities - Measures
Prohibitingthe Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R, para. 7.639. While the Appellate Body (and Panel, albeit via logic rejected by the Appellate Body) found that the EU's measure did
not satisfy the Art. XX chapeau and thus would need to be modified in some way (paras. 5.338-5.339), its
finding under XX(a) is of potentially major significance.
101 See Robert Howse and Makau Mutua, ProtectingHuman Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges
for the World Trade Organization, Rights and Democracy (Jan. 11 2000), available at http://www.iatp
.org/files/ProtectingHuman Rights in-aGlobalEconomyCh.htm (arguing that Art. XX should be
interpreted consistent with international human rights law norms).
102 GATT Art. XXI(b).
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the security interests relate to fissionable materials; arms and other munitions
trafficking; or times of war or other emergencies. 0 3
The use of Article XXI has been limited to date.104 However, during the
GATT era, it was the basis - in tandem with United Nations Security Council
authorization - for signatories to impose sanctions on South Africa. 05 Because
Article XXI reads as a self-executing provision - meaning that the member
makes the determination as to whether the exception applies, not a dispute settlement panel - there may be further policy space available here to respond to
human rights violations committed by another WTO member.
4.

Waivers

A further flexibility within the WTO is the ability for members to provide a
waiver to excuse one or more members from abiding by some aspect of their
WTO commitments. 0 6 The waiver process was used in the context of a shared
view that WTO members should comply with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which was designed to prevent any trade in diamonds that have not
been certified as conflict-free. Implementing the Kimberley Process requires
members to prohibit importation of certain diamonds. In theory, such import restrictions could have been justified under either Article XX or XXI of GATT. 0 7
However, because members did not wish to rely upon the potential application of
an exception, they instead decided to draft a waiver to excuse members from
complying with WTO obligations to the extent such noncompliance was necessary to comply with the Kimberley process. While the waiver may not have been
necessary (because Article XX or XXI could perhaps have been relied upon as
defenses, had a country trading in conflict diamonds challenged a ban on importation of such diamonds), the relevant point here is that waivers are another tool
WTO members can use to limit trade in order to further human rights objectives.
V.

Conclusion

Human rights provisions in FTAs may have a positive effect on human rights
adherence in some cases. However, such advances are likely to be around the
margins, as the most serious human rights offending countries and the most corrupt nations are largely not participating in FTAs. In addition, FTAs present
some concerns due to the inequality of bargaining power that exists in agree103 Id.
10 See, e.g., Roger Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. Riy. 697, 707.

Olufemi Amao, Trade Sanctions, Human Rights and MultinationalCorporations: the EU-ACP
Context, 32 HASTINGS INT'l & CoMIr. L. REv. 379, 389 (2009) ("[S]anctions were successfully imposed
based on Article XXI and United Nations Security Council authorisation, for gross violations of human
rights in the territory."). See S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. SIRES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977); S.C. Res. 569, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/569 (Jul. 26, 1985).
106 See Marrakesh Agreement, Art. IX:3-5. Waivers require the approval of at least three fourths of
the WTO membership. Marrakesh Agreement, Art. IX:3.
107 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassionor Superiority Complex? What to Make of the WTO
Waiver for 'Conflict Diamonds', 24 MICH. J. INT'tL L. 1177 (2003).
105
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ments featuring a developed and a developing country; the inclusion alongside
human rights obligations of certain provisions, such as TRIPS-plus intellectual
property provisions that may conflict with human rights objectives; and the trend
towards FTAs that will largely exclude developing countries and their interests.
The data is more convincing with respect to a linkage between WTO membership
and an improvement in human rights. In addition, the WTO provides a more
conducive forum than FTAs for developing countries to have a voice in the policies that affect them. There is policy space within the WTO for developed countries to adopt policies to encourage developing countries to adhere to human
rights obligations, but at the same time, allow the developing countries to express
their own views on these issues. As such, those interested in promoting human
rights in developing countries should focus less on pushing human rights obligations in FTAs and more on bringing countries into the WTO and working therein
to effect agreements that will help the economies - and in conjunction the human
rights records - of developing countries.
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